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THE U.S. NAVY
Into Africa
Jonathan Stevenson
Although Africa has long been a low strategic priority for the United States,Washington now has a sharp and pronounced strategic interest in protect-
ing access to rich reserves of sub-Saharan oil and gas, mainly in the vicinity of
the Gulf of Guinea, as part of its drive to reduce dependence on Middle East sup-
pliers. By 2010, Africa’s share of U.S. oil imports could rise to 20 percent, and
China has begun to engage the United States in a geopolitical contest for hydro-
carbons and other economic and political benefits in sub-Saharan Africa. There
are also roughly 400 million Muslims in Africa, and Muslim radicalism has been
on the rise in countries like Nigeria and Somalia, the latter of which has become
a hot training destination for aspiring jihadists. Weak and failed states are vul-
nerable to co-optation by bad actors, and there are more of them—the two of
greatest concern being Islamist-governed Sudan and anarchic Somalia—in
sub-Saharan Africa than anywhere else. Some of Africa’s problems are of interest
to the United States as a matter of philosophical values, as opposed to immediate
strategic interests. Poverty and disease (HIV/AIDS in particular) pervade the
continent, and many of Africa’s fifty-three nations are politically unstable or
economically dysfunctional or are run by malign regimes. Zimbabwe, for exam-
ple, is afflicted by all of these scourges.
Accordingly, the Department of Defense conceived Africa Command, or
AFRICOM, to help Africans help themselves and to
frame Africa, for purposes of formulating and imple-
menting American foreign policy, as an end in itself
rather than the geopolitical construct that it was dur-
ing the Cold War. The idea is for the U.S. military to
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stress the prevention of and, contingently, preparation for insecurity through
building African military capacity rather than to default to mere crisis manage-
ment. AFRICOM would become a key component in an interagency effort to
use especially “nonkinetic” military resources (e.g., command, control, and
communication assets; engineering capabilities; and public health expertise) to
provide more readily benefits related to humanitarian assistance and develop-
ment, as well as improvements in defense infrastructure, and to support (not
control) African leadership.1 Announcing AFRICOM’s creation in February
2007, a Pentagon spokesman said that many of its missions would in fact be
nonkinetic ones, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and that the
command would be set up mainly for preventing war and establishing stability.2
Yet Africans have not easily bought into Africa Command. Washington’s
public-relations rollout of AFRICOM in early and mid-2007 came at an inoppor-
tune time, when the security situation in Iraq was deteriorating and U.S. forward
military activity was perceived, at worst, as imperialistic and recklessly inept or, at
best, as focused exclusively on counterterrorism and devoid of any broader effort
to help host nations. Amplifying this problem, the official line on AFRICOM was
scattershot. The Defense Department first bruited the possibility of new Ameri-
can military bases in Africa, then blandly cast the new command as simply a bu-
reaucratic reorganization that rationalized responsibility for the continent by
unifying it (except Egypt) under a single combatant command. The Pentagon’s
statement that the new command’s focus would be preventing rather than fight-
ing wars came later. In yet another tonal shift, the State Department in April 2008
portrayed AFRICOM’s inception as “history in the making.”3
The mixed signals in these official characterizations of AFRICOM have fu-
eled rising fears of American hegemony and the “militarization” of America’s
Africa policy. Africa Command currently operates out of the headquarters of
European Command—which previously had responsibility for West Africa—in
Stuttgart, Germany, with supporting Army and Navy components based in
Vicenza, Italy, and Naples, Italy, respectively. Only war-torn Liberia has offered
to host an AFRICOM regional headquarters. The fourteen-nation Southern Af-
rican Development Community voted expressly not to do so. Algeria and Libya
unceremoniously ruled out the possibility, and Morocco—the closest ally of the
United States in North Africa—has shown no enthusiasm. In December 2007,
Nigeria officially rejected a request that it agree to be the venue for a regional
headquarters and encouraged other African nations to follow its lead; Ghana,
arguably the most pro-American country in West Africa, did so. In May 2008,
AFRICOM put aside plans for a permanent regional headquarters and decided
instead to place staff in embassy-based offices of defense cooperation, on an
as-needed basis.4 More recently, African resistance to AFRICOM appears to be
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diminishing, but the neuralgic attitude of African populations and governments
toward American “boots on the ground” is durable. Given that reality, it is
salutary that the U.S. Navy, rather than the Army, is taking the lead in a new
strategic effort in Africa.
THE AFRICA PARTNERSHIP STATION
This endeavor is the “Africa Partnership Station,” or APS, a small and varied
group of warships that completed a six-month tour in the Gulf of Guinea, the
first of its kind in that region, in April 2008.5 The APS’s lead element was the USS
Fort McHenry (LSD 43), a 610-foot amphibious landing ship whose shallow
draft and multiple shore-connecting modes eased the task of pursuing concur-
rent operations in several locations. Other Navy ships involved were the
high-speed vessel (HSV) Swift, a 322-foot catamaran originally meant for mine
warfare and for developing littoral combat concepts; the USS Annapolis (SSN
760), a nuclear attack submarine; and the 567-foot USS San Jacinto (CG 56), a
guided-missile cruiser. Part of the Navy’s Global Fleet Station program, the APS
is based on the recently refined strategic concept of “maritime sector develop-
ment.” The operational goal is to establish maritime safety and security by build-
ing African naval capabilities in maritime domain awareness, military
professionalism, technical infrastructure, and operational response. The strate-
gic objective is to make African nations both self-sufficient in maintaining mar-
itime security and more favorably disposed toward the United States, through
relationships enriched through the operation of the APS itself.
The notion of a “thousand-ship navy”—mooted by the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, in 2005, when he was Chief of Naval
Operations—contemplates a set of navies aligned with that of the United States
with total assets of as many as a thousand vessels.6 More particularly, Admiral
Harry Ulrich—as (before his recent retirement) commander of Naval Forces
Europe (NAVEUR), with a pre-AFRICOM area of responsibility that covered
the Gulf of Guinea—believed that the Navy had to do something operationally
constructive between maritime wars. To him, this meant disabusing African
governments of any grandiose dreams they might have of acquiring power-
projecting blue-water navies that they did not really need, while encouraging
and supporting their efforts to develop brown-water patrolling and policing ca-
pabilities that would address immediate maritime security demands and to es-
tablish interoperable forces that would engender a truly regional capability.7 The
APS concept is designed to develop mutually advantageous relationships—that
is, partnerships—rather than dependencies. For African nations, there are
strong motivations to cooperate. A quarter of the cocaine consumed in Europe
is transshipped through West Africa. Some 60 percent of the world’s human
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trafficking occurs in sub-Saharan Africa. Attacks in Africa were largely responsi-
ble for the 10 percent global increase in piracy in 2007. Sub-Saharan Africa loses
a billion dollars a year to illegal fishing, and illegal oil bunkering in Nigeria alone
sucks three million dollars a day from the legitimate economy. Further, African na-
tions share global strategic objectives, such as counterproliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and interdiction of the narcotics traffic.
In formulating and honing the Africa Partnership Station concept, NAVEUR
under Admiral Ulrich carefully considered what message it would send to Afri-
can populations and governments and how it would affect their views of the
United States—in a phrase, strategic communication. Barring outright armed
intervention, NAVEUR decided, it made sense to operate from ships, without
the political and psychological baggage that came with a big American ground
presence. Hence, the APS would make long-term patrols with frequent but rela-
tively brief stops, offering operational training to build durable ties and com-
munity outreach programs to improve local goodwill. Thus, the program seems
a sensible diplomatic remediation of a George W. Bush–era foreign policy that
has, on balance, alienated foreigners and made overseas partners more tentative
about their links with Washington. At the same time, the creation of AFRICOM
appears to signal a pragmatic and largely apolitical reorientation of American
military priorities in an epoch of Middle East instability, a reorientation that
stresses the protection of non–Middle East oil supplies and the containment of
Islamic radicalism and terrorism.
THE APS AND THE NAVY’S STRATEGIC RELEVANCE
In the first decade of the nineteenth century, the U.S. Navy helped reestablish
maritime security in Africa during the small naval wars against the Barbary pi-
rates. About a hundred years later, Theodore Roosevelt’s “gunboat diplo-
macy”—employed to consolidate American primacy and bolster American
political and economic interests—followed from Alfred Thayer Mahan’s theory
of sea power, which cast a powerful blue-water U.S. Navy as the vehicle and guar-
antor of national economic prosperity and international political clout. Neither
model, however, neatly fits with the APS, which is the product of innovative
twenty-first-century thinking within the Navy. It was the commander of Naval
Forces Europe—not the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the State Depart-
ment—who convened and hosted the inaugural Gulf of Guinea Maritime Secu-
rity Conference, in October 2004. The Navy’s theater security engagement plan,
anchored by the APS, has been more enterprising vis-à-vis Africa than has plan-
ning by other elements of the U.S. interagency framework.
The APS also appears well designed to meet the Navy’s internal challenges. Of
the four major services, the Navy has the smallest pieces of the counterterrorism
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and counterinsurgency “pies” and therefore faces budgetary disfavor in the
short term. Strategically, it is incumbent on the Navy to husband its resources
for any blue-water naval challenge from China in decades to come, while bu-
reaucratically the service needs to secure a role in safeguarding more urgent
American interests, such as ensuring access to oil and winning hearts and minds
in places that could otherwise prove vulnerable to Islamic radicalism. The Navy
has understood that a large American ground-force presence could undermine
both of these key American strategic interests in Africa, by discomfiting local
populations and moving people to active opposition to the United States. Mari-
time initiatives like the APS, however, are inherently less intrusive than
ground-based ones; with the Navy in front, the United States could win over Af-
rican governments and populations and shore up local goodwill. While the Navy
may carry some historical baggage as a practitioner of gunboat diplomacy, the
Africa Partnership Station projects a more benign image to potential allies,
partners, and even adversaries.
Of course, certain U.S. ground-based military efforts in Africa may be un-
avoidable with respect to American interests, values, or both. Accordingly, in
continuing to clarify the uses of Africa Command for public consumption,
Washington should acknowledge openly and clearly that two of the new com-
mand’s biggest challenges may end up as sustaining energy security for mutual
benefit, as well as peacekeeping and state building, which the Pentagon is weav-
ing more thoroughly into U.S. military doctrine.8 It should note further that
AFRICOM will provide the United States with bureaucratic means for enhanc-
ing diplomatic and military-to-military relationships with key African states
and regional organizations the better to meet these challenges. The United States
should also emphasize its official preference that African forces or United Na-
tions peacekeeping contingents, rather than the American military or U.S.-led
coalitions, be used in African territory.
At first blush, such a dispensation seems to cut against the Defense Depart-
ment’s reconfiguration of the ground-force structure through the dramatic ex-
pansion of the remit, personnel, and budget of U.S. Special Operations
Command. The Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA),
which will become an AFRICOM asset, constitutes an early example of this new
bias. It has facilitated impressive regional partnerships and a desirable inter-
agency approach to humanitarian assistance and military-to-military training
programs, but most Africans see that force mainly as a hard counterterrorism
tool—its most visible effort being support of the Ethiopia-led occupation of So-
malia and targeting of suspected terrorists there, sometimes with regrettable
and politically inflammatory civilian losses. Thus, CJTF-HOA tends to signify
uses of force that jeopardize rather than advance the long-term strategic
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position of the United States in Africa.9 Accordingly, the suggestions of some
American officials that Africa Command’s prospective mode of engagement
should be modeled on CJTF-HOA’s local-capacity-building mission seem dubi-
ous.10 Instead, the policy thrust should be toward increases in AFRICOM
funding for foreign military financing, international military education and train-
ing, and peacekeeping operations—to all of which the APS would contribute. This
would at once accelerate the American objective of building African military capac-
ity, improve interoperability critical for any combined deployments that may be-
come necessary for peace enforcement or peacekeeping, and validate the stated U.S.
intention to help Africans to help themselves.
So framed, Africa Command should become more acceptable than it initially
has been to African governments and populations and ultimately win their ap-
proval, or at least acquiescence. Yet the Africa Partnership Station has already
earned the confidence and enthusiastic participation of most littoral West Afri-
can states, and it remains at once the most operationally effective and politically
agreeable component of the military engagement of the United States with
sub-Saharan Africa. In that light, it may well prove Africa Command’s most
politically valuable strategic asset.
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